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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
case.13 Another reason is that those previously brought to
trial were convicted on the authority of case law then in
effect.14 Retroactive application has extended only to those
cases pending appeal when the Mapp decision was rendered."
The Supreme Court, aware of the retroactive effect given
to its prior decisions, failed to expressly limit the newly
enunciated constitutional right to the future. In such light
and based on the constitutional question involved, at least
one other case has declared that Mapp v. Ohio applies retro-
actively.1 6 The failure to object to the admissibility of evi-
dence should not be a waiver of the constitutional right,
for under these circumstances, justice requires a departure
from the ordinary waiver rule.
17
North Dakota has held according to the nonexclusionary
rule regarding admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.",
They must now adopt the exclusionary rule set out in Mapp
v. Ohio. Pertaining to the question of retroactive applica-
tion it is submitted that the decision of the court in the in-
stant case is the proper interpretation.
NEIL A. MCEWEN
INSURANCE - EXTENT OF LOSS AND LIABILITY OF INSURER-
DEFENSE OF ACTIONS - Defendant insurance company
issued an automobile liability policy to insured and certi-
fied that the policy complied with provisions of the financial
responsibility law. Subsequently plaintiff sustained losses
caused by insured's negligence, and following unsuccessful
negotiations with defendant, instituted proceedings against
insured. Insured failed to notify defendant of the impending
suit as required by the policy; subsequently plaintiff recover-
ed a default judgment. Upon defendant's refusal to satisfy
13. E.g. State v. Long, 71 N.J. Super. 583, 177 A.2d 609 (1962).
14. Commonwealth v. Mancini, 198 Pa. Super. 642, 184 A.2d 279 (1962).
15. E.g. People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478 (1961).
16. Hurst v. People of State of Cal., 211 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Cal. 1962):
See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) wherein Mr. Justice Field
expressed an analogous theory: "An unconstitutional act is not a law: it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it Is, in legal contemplation, qs inoperative as though it had
never been passed."
17. See, Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); See generally, Broeder,
The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 185, 209 (1961).
18. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925).
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the judgment, plaintiff filed garnishment proceedings against
the defendant and recovered a judgment. The Maryland
Court of Appeals in affirming the decision held, that failure
of the insured to comply with the policy requirement of notify-
ing the insurer of suits instituted against insured did not
preclude recovery by plaintiff under Maryland's Financial
Responsibility Act.' National Indemnity Co. v. Simmons,
230 M 234, 186 A.2d 595 (1962).
Under a voluntary liability policy the injured party's
right to recover normally is subject to any defenses the
company may have against the insured.2  When an auto-
mobile liability policy is issued pursuant to and in compliance
with a financial responsibility law, the insurer may be held
liable to one injured notwithstanding the fact that the insured
himself has lost his rights under the policy by failing to
comply with its conditions.3 Under such a statute, the view
has been taken that the rights of the injured person are
independent of,4 and not simply derivative from, those of
the insured.5 Thus, failure to give notice of the suit does
not constitute a defense to an action by an injured party to
recover from the insurer, 6 nor does lack of co-operation by
the insured alter the third party's right of recovery.
7
The majority of states which have enacted financial
responsibility laws provide that the policies issued pursuant
1. Md. Code Ann. art. 661 § 131(a)(6)(F) (1957). "That the liability
of the insurance carrier shall become absolute whenever loss or damage
included in such policy occurs, and the satisfaction by the insured per-
son of a final judgment for such loss or damage shall not be a condition
precedent to the right or obligation of the carrier to make payment on
account of such loss or damage; provided that no suit shall be brought
against the insurance carrier until thirty (30) days after the entry of a
final judgment against the insured person for such loss or damage." Cf.,
N.D. Cent. Code § 39-16-20(6)(a) (1960). "The liability of the insurance
carrier with respect to the insurance required by this chapter shall be-
come absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle
liability policy occurs; said policy may not be canceled or annulled as to
such liability by any agreement between the insurance carrier and the
insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage; no statement by
the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said policy shall defeat
or void said policy." (Emphasis added.)
2. See generally, 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE,,
4816 (1962).
3. Royal Indem. Co. v. Olmstead, 193 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1951); Cf.,
Hynding v. Home Ace. Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P.2d 999 (1932).
4. Farm Bureau Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N.H. 196, 84 A.2d 823 (1951).
5. Prisuda v. General Cas Co. of America, 1 Wis. 2d 166, 83 N.W.2d
739 (1957).
6. Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960).
7. Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Peterson, 113 F.2d 4 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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thereto become absolute after loss occurs. Courts which
have had occasion to construe absolute have interpreted it
in context as absolute, but only up to the statutory amounts. 9
Other requisites for absolute liability are that the policy was
required, 10 was certified as proof of financial responsibil-
ity,1 ' and was issued by the irsurer with the knowledge
that it was a required and certified policy.
12
The purpose of financial responsibility laws is to benefit
and protect injured members of the public; the injured per-
son's loss of such benefit by the insured's violation of notice
and co-operation provisions would not be in accord with such
purpose. 13  When an insurance policy has been issued in
pursuance of a statute which forbids the operation of a motor
vehicle until good and sufficient security has been given,
the court should construe the statute and policy liberally
in light of the legislative purpose.1
4
It is submitted that an insurer who certifies that an ir-
responsible motorist is protected under its policy and thus
permits that motorist to obtain a license to operate an auto-
mobile indiscriminately on the state's highways should not
be heard to complain of any resultant liability incurred by
the fault of the insured. The insurer issues the certificate
in compliance with the statute and is presumed to be cogni-
zant of its provisions. It should realize that the type of
motorist required to submit such certificate is the very one
against whom the protection has been provided.
PETER A. QUIST
8. E.g., Il. Stat. Ann. ch. 951 § 7-317(f)(1) (1958): Iowa Code Ann.
§ 321A.21 (6) (a) (1962); Minn. Stat. Ann- § 170.40 (6) (1) (1960); Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. § 53-438(f)(1) (1947); N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Laws § 345(i)(1)
(1960); S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 212 § 51(6)(a) (1957). Comparable phraseology
was found in all state codes except that of Alaska, for which no financial
responsibility law could be found. Supra note 1.
9. Supra note 4.
10. Sutton v. Hawkeye Cas Co.. 138 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1943); Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Breen, 2 App. Div. 2d 271, 153 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1956);
Cohen v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 223 App. Div. 340, 252 N.Y.S. 841 (1931).
11. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir.
1949); New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 123 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. La. 1954);
Hoosier Cas. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa
1952).
12. Buzzone v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 23 N.J. 447, 129 A.2d 561
(1957).
13. See, Hynding v. Home Acc. Ins. Co., supra note 3.
14. O'Roak v. Lloyds Cas. Co., 285 Mass. 532, 189 N.E. 571 (1934).
